Three Statements on Animal Rights versus Animal Welfare

Three prominent figures in the animal advocacy movement talk about rights versus welfare.

Stephen Clark

[The point has been] put very well. All I'd add is that the evidence from the UK is that the anti-vivisectionist movement was sidelined in the early part of this century, and the animal rights movement initiated by Henry Salt was defeated, precisely because there was so much infighting. We only got back on line when (in the seventies and eighties) we began to work politically, and accept "improvements" in the exploitative industries as something to work towards.

Brutally: we are not going to get Abolition either locally, or globally, unless the Galactic Empire arrives and orders us at laser-point to change. What we are going to get, and are getting, is a gradual change of consciousness, issuing in many little improvements, that may eventually approximate to abolition (or at least as close to abolition as human slavery now is, i.e., there are undoubtedly still slaves, but not as many as there were).

I do not myself much care for the rhetoric of rights, but I am, in essence, on the AR rather than the traditional AW side. I am absolutely against abolitionism when that gets in the way of genuine improvement, and hardens exploiters into their traditional attitudes. I am especially against those who argue that "more good is done in the long run by leaving conditions unimproved": that is exactly the line taken by experimentalists, farmers, hunters, etc., who justify particular assaults on our fellow creatures by talking of a future (often quite imaginary) advantage.

Stephen Clark
srlclark@liverpool.ac.uk
http://www.liv.ac.uk/~srlclark/philos.html

Gary Francione

I agree with [the] view that Zoe and others (Stallwood, Shapiro, etc.) think that they differ from the traditional welfarists because, unlike the traditional welfarists, they seek the abolition of exploitation as a long-term goal. Where they and I differ is, among other things, they believe that it is acceptable to use welfarist means to achieve that end. That is, the "new welfarists" like Zoe really differ from the classical welfarists like Christine Stevens in their ultimate objectives but employ similar "tactics."

This raises the issue of whether a movement's ends dictate its means. For example, assume that I have as my long-term goal the recognition of womens' rights in all aspects of their lives. Were I to advocate that we achieve this long-term goal by abusing women you would probably find it odd that I was advocating a means that was inconsistent with my long-term goal.

Why isn't the same true of the animal issue???? If we believe that animal welfare is different from animal rights (a separate topic; I am assuming the difference for the purposes of this posting), then it is very legitimate to ask from a moral point of view whether it is OK to ignore the moral rights of some animals today (welfarist reform) in the hope that other animals in the future will possess social recognition of those moral rights. In addition, the empirical evidence indicates clearly that welfarist reform does not lead to the abolition of institutionalized exploitation.

Moreover, I do not believe that Zoe, Stallwood, Barnes, etc., mean the same thing as rights when they talk about compassion. For example, both Barnes and Weil argue that compassion is the central focus and the rights/welfare distinction not really meaningful in a practical sense. In my view, that is dead wrong. The whole point of rights is that they do not depend on compassion or sympathy or anything else. They are owed as a matter of formal justice. Although many people may respect animal rights out of compassion, many more will not. What do we say to them? "OK, if you don't feel compassion for animals, then you can keep on abusing them until you feel something?" That is not how I interpret the notion of "rights." The fact that people of color have rights does not and should not hinge on whether we have sympathy or compassion.

In sum, I have very serious difficulty in regarding the prevailing movement paradigm as a modified form of a "rights" view; I see the modern movement as representing what I call "new welfarism." This is the view that the long-term goal is abolition but the short term "tactic" is welfarist reform. I maintain that a movement's ends define its means, and that any incremental approach must be both abolitionist in itself and accompanied by a continuing and aggressive critique of the remaining parts of the system. Frankly, I am bewildered by animal advocates who believe that they are rightists but who, for example, argue in favor of various limp welfarist reforms by arguing that it will be in the interests of the exploiters. In any event, this issue is the subject of my forthcoming book, "Animal Rights and Animal Welfare: The Ideology of a Social Protest Movement," which is going into production this fall and will be published probably in late spring 1996.

I think that the modern movement uses rights only in a "rhetorical" sense; that is, the use of rights does not reflect the central concerns of moral or legal rights. I am currently having an exchange of letters with people at the AV, and I am quite amazed to report that Zoe Weil objects to my characterization of her essay as a "plea for animal welfare." Zoe denied she is a welfarist, and denied that her statement "animal welfare does mean something good and positive" is not support for animal welfare! I am sorry, but if we chose twenty people randomly, and who were not involved in the "movement," they would be as bewildered by Zoe's statement as am I.

In my new book, I use the following example:

Imagine that you are a guard in a concentration camp (what is relevant here is that the prisoners are all free of any wrongdoing that would justify the abrogation of their liberty). One day, a prisoner being led off to death asks you for a drink of water. Assume that you conclude that you are obligated to give the person the drink, and you do so.

All of a sudden, it occurs to you that this whole business of imprisoning and killing innocent people for their political views (or race, or color, or religion, etc.) is wrong because it is unjust -- that is, it represents the institutionalized exploitation of beings whose rights to liberty should not be abrogated in this way. You decide that you must do something about these prison camps. At this point, you have at least two options:

  1. You can proceed on the view that suffering is the only or the primary interest that you are concerned about, and although you want to end the camps, you proceed as follows:

    First, you seek a law that requires that each prisoner get a drink of water on the way to execution.

    Second, you seek another law that requires that they get a glass of water every three hours.

    Third, you seek a law that requires that the prisoners be provided with reading material while they are awaiting death.

    Fourth, you seek a law that requires that all prisoners be provided with "humane" treatement.

    Fifth, you seek a law that requires that all prisoners be gassed, and not electrocuted.

    Get the idea? However silly it appears, all of these "reforms" do -- and without dopubt -- alleviate suffering to some degree.

  2. You may undertake a massive public-education campaign to make people aware of this injustice in an effort to build a political coalition that will COMPEL the political system to abolish the camps.
My point is that just because I may be obligated to give an individual prisoner on the way to death a glass of water does not mean that as a matter of social or legal change, I ought to try to eradicate the institutionalized exploitation by spending my time and resources in seeking laws that require that water be given. In my book, I talk about "micro" and "macro" moral decisions. On the micro level, I would certainly see myself as morally obligated to give water to a thirsty cow on the way to slaughter whether or not I was ultimately opposed to all meat eating. That is, I think that the obligation to give the cow water can be based on either a welfarist or rightist basis. But what I do not think is the case is that it is consistent with a rights approach to try to require on a macro level that all cows be given water on the way to slaughter. If my ultimate concern is in the injustice of the institutionalized exploitation (which includes, but is not limited to concerns about pain and suffering -- after all, the concentration camp would be objectionable even if all the innocent prisoners were treated "humanely" and not subjected to any pain at the time of their death), then my concern has to be directed at abolishing the structural form of exploitation.

In our present system, amimals may be subjected to whatever pain and suffering and death is consistent with their efficient exploitation as property. As I argue in my earlier book "Animals, Property, and the Law," animal welfare has, for the most part, never provided protection that exceeded the level necessary to ensure that animal property is exploited efficiently. As long as the "lab animal" is producing good "data," then that level of care is all that is required because the only value of the animal to the owner is its production of "reliable data." Any level of care that exceeds that level required to provide "reliable data" represents an unjustifiable (to the owner of the animal) cost. And in a society that values both the institution of property and the ability of property owners to be the (pretty much) primary (if not exclusive) valuers of property, animals will always lose.

It is understandable that people who care about animals want to reduce animal suffering. That is why we would ALL agree that we ought to give a drink of water to the thirsty cow. To put the matter another way, the rightists and welfarists can agree on what is required on the "micro" level -- give a drink to the cow. Where we differ is what to do on the "macro" level of social and legal change. Once we have determined that it is the institutionalized exploitation of the prisoner (or the animal) that is unjust, then we have to decide how to dismantle that structure. And in my opinion, we cannot dismantle the structure by seeking reforms that try to do on the "macro" level what is done on the "micro" level. We can spend forever trying to decrease the suffering of the prisoners in the concentration camp (or the animals), but there is, I fear, no connection between these reforms and the ultimate abolition of the institution. Indeed, the whole approach seems counterproductive and intuitively problematic: why would people want to abolish an institution that had been reformed and made "humane" without any "unnecessary" suffering?

Finally, please let me clarify one point. Some of our colleagues claim that my position is that I think that those who advocate the welfarist approach should be "excluded" from the movement. I do not believe any such thing. My point is quite simple: it is folly to talk about "unity" between those who believe that the correct approach is to try to get drinks of water, reading material, better food, etc., for political prisoners (or animals), and those who want to spend their time and resources in taking direct steps to abolish the institutionalized exploitation. This abolition will not occur overnight, but the past several hundred years of animal welfare does not suggest that it will work any faster (and I believe that it will not and cannot work at all because there is no connection in logic, morality, or experience between welfarist reform and abolition). I do not wish to exclude welfarists from anything. Let them try to solve the problems in their way. My point is that those of us who subscribe to the rights view ought not to be advocating welfarist reform as a means to the long-term goal of abolition. The notion of "exclusion" makes sense only if we think that there is one "movement." In my view, there are different -- and inconsistent -- approaches to the problem.

The bottom line: however much you and I may agree that the prison camp is immoral and should be abolished, at some point, we have to decide what to do about it. If your sggestion is to try to get water, reading material, and better food for the prisoners, and my suggestion is to organize massive, non-violent protest, educate widely, and try to make people aware of the injustice of the institutionalized form of exploitation and the need to abolish it and not reform it, then, despite any agreement we may have on long-term goal, our practical efforts will proceed in different directions. The difficulty is that those who think that the right approach is to get water and reading material for the prisoners think that those of us who disagree are "divisive." But that assumes that THEIR position (that welfarist reform will lead someday to the abolition of exploitation) is correct. And there simply isn't any proof of that. After all, the most obnoxious and pervasive form of animal exploitation human history has ever recorded is intensive agriculture -- which developed over the past thirty years despite the broadly accepted welfarist notion that we ought to treat animals "humanely."

To take exception to the position adopted by certain animal advocates is not to be "divisive." It is just to disagree. And unless the "movement" is really a cult, there is nothing wrong or undesirable about such disagreement.

Gary Francione

Kim Stallwood

[The] eloquent interpretations periodically interspersed throughout the rights/ecology debate are very much appreciated. When [one] distinguishes the differences but similarities between Francione and Newkirk over strategies, however, I believe an additional point needs to be made. As it currently reads, one may conclude that Francione only believes in an abolitionist strategy toward abolitionist ends whereas Newkirk only believes in a regulatory strategy toward abolitionist ends. I don't think this is entirely accurate. I believe Newkirk's position (and, indeed, mine) is that the circumstances dictate the strategy. In other words, both the abolitionist approach and the regulatory approach are acceptable methods toward ending animal exploitation. The rationale used to determine their application is dependent upon the particular set of circumstances of the given situation. Sadly, our movement, throughout its intemperate history, has obssessed over these and other differences. This has resulted in a perennially divided movement. This is our eternal downfall: our inability to learn how to balance our utopian visions and pragmatic politics and build a movement-wide coalition of animal advocacy organizations. A movement-wide coalition would act like a conductor of an orchestra by focussing the players on the same symphony, that is, on a public education and legislative program that brings together the maximum number of animal rights/welfare/protection organizations. This strategy does not preclude any of the participating organizations from forming their own string quartets to play music that an orchestra cannot. Our inability to accomplish this is the reason why our movement consistently fails to make the progress it should and why we cannot command the respectful attention of legislators, the serious press, academicians, the business community, etc. Finally, a thundering round of applause to the folks at the national and local organizations and those individuals who worked hard on the mink subsidy victory. What an excellent example of what can be accomplished when we work together.

[Someone] wrote that he agreed with Francione's interpretation of my position in that I am accurately portrayed as a "new welfarist." This is not accurate. Please let me refer everyone to my words above about strategies, where I wrote that the strategy depends on the circumstances. In the vast majority of cases, I follow and advocate an abolitionist strategy. This has been my position for 20 years. I recognize, however, that there are exceptions to the rule. I recall, for example, at PETA the case of toe clipping of rats, mice, and guinea pigs to identify particular animals being experimented upon in a research laboratory. PETA was successful in abolishing the toe clipping but continues to work on this case toward the elimination of this research. If my support for the abolition of toe clipping qualifies me as a "new welfarist" then so be it. May I request, however, that the nomenclature be changed. How about "nouveau welfarist" or "virtual animal rights advocate"? In other words, does one disqualify oneself from being called an animal rights advocate when one argues once in a lifetime, or once a decade, or once in a while that a nonabolitionist goal is acceptable and when the decision is based upon a strategic viewpoint and not a philosophical one. Or is one doomed to being a "nouveau welfarist," sorry, "new welfarist," for the rest of one's life? Or is it possible that the abolition of the toe clipping is an acceptable abolitionist goal?

Kim W. Stallwood
Editor in Chief
The Animals' Agenda